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In order to be able to judge anything, it is first necessary to
establish the criterion against which to measure the thing being judged.
This is as true in the field of the freedom-of-the-individual as affected
by the impact of a federal loyalty-security program as in any other
field. To provide such a criterion-or, perhaps more realistically, desider-
atum-no better resort could be had than to The Godkin Lectures at
Harvard University, 1955, delivered by John Lord O'Brian and
entitled "National Security and Individual Freedom."
Mr. O'Brian reminds us of the ethical and moral content of the
constitution and the Bill of Rights and the American sense of fair
play-that unique and peculiarly Amercian sense of fair play-which
is the natural fruit of such rich soil. This great constitutional lawyer
and leader of American Bar-a man who is also acutely aware of the
nature of the Communist danger-proceeds to examine the state of
the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans as affected by the
federal loyalty-security program. He finds that the steps taken in the
name of security are at variance with our heritage of constitutionalism
and our American conception of fair play.
In the process of searching the American scene to determine the
area in which our historic individual freedoms are jeopardized by the
federal loyalty-security programs, Mr. O'Brian determined that the
following governmental developments "seem to provide unmistakable
evidence of an expanding trend of policies at variance" with our long-
established and hard won liberties:
1. "The establishment in our jurisprudence of the doctrine im-
puting guilt because of associations."
2. "Conferring upon administrative officials the right to investi-
gate and pass upon the character of opinions entertained by an individual
and upon his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
3. "Adjudging men to be untrustworthy, not because of wrongful
acts, but because of their ideas, because of motives attributed to them,
or because of suspicion as to their future conduct."
4. "The promulgation by the Attorney General of lists of organi-
zations thought to be subversive and the use of these lists in determining
qualifications for employment."
5. "The use of secret information contributed by anonymous
accusers."
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6. "The denial of the right of cross-examination to the accused
person.
7. "The lack of any constitutional protection which might be
given through judicial review."
8. "The supervision and limitation of the freedom to travel by
American citizens."
9. "The participation of military officials in many decisions affect-
ing the guarantees of the Bill of Rights."
10. "The interference with the right of a citizen to work in a
defense plant or on American ships."
11. "The establishment of security officers and of hearing panels
in all governmental agencies drawn exclusively from governmental
personnel and operating without any central supervision or determina-
tion of uniform procedures."'
All in all, Mr. O'Brian makes a strong indictment coupled with
a fervent prayer and hope that leaders will arise to stop these trends
which are encroaching more and more on the individual's freedom in
our society.
That Mr. O'Brian was concerned with a problem which was
troubling the nation may be seen from the fact that on April 20, 1956,
there was submitted the Report of the Special Committee on the
Federal Loyalty-Security Program of The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York2 (hereinafter referred to as the New York
Report) and on June 21, 1957 there was published the Report of
the Commission on Government Security.? The New York Report
was financed by a grant from the Fund for the Republic, which there-
after interfered in no way with the compiling of the report; and the
Commission Report was compiled and financed pursuant to Public Law
304, 84th Congress, as amended. The nine members of the Special
Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program were practicing
lawyers from all parts of the country appointed by the President of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, while the twelve
members of the Commission on Government Security were appointed
four each by the President of the United States, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives with six
persons being from each of the two major political parties.
It will be the purpose of this article to compare in broad outline
the New York Report with the Commission Report against the backdrop
I O'Brian, National Security and Individual Freedom, THE GODKIN LECTURES
46-48, (1955). Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University
Press, Copyright, 1955, by The President and Fellows of Harvard College.
2 SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT (1956).
3 COMIISSIOy ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY, REPORT (1957).
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provided by Mr. O'Brian's points-which is to say, from a substantive
freedom-of-the-individual point of view.
THE MATTER OF THE APPROACH
The approach, the viewpoint, the aim, the guiding spirit, or what-
ever you may wish to call it-that motivates men doing a particular job
will in great measure shape the outcome of the finished product. This
is especially true when the job is the re-examination of the federal
loyalty-scurity program. How the results comport with the traditional
American sense of fair play and constitutionalism will depend largely
on the basic approach taken in each case.
The New York Approach
Part I, Chapter I,4 of the New York Report is entitled "Liberty
and Security" and the order of these two words--"Liberty" and
"Security"--cannot be taken to be mere happenstance. The Commit-
tee's approach is exemplified by the following statements:
After setting forth a description of the Communist threat and
an acknowledgment that the United States must guard itself against
a heretofore unprecedented threat of Communist penetration from
within,6 the New York Report makes a balanced and cogent analysis
of the elements of national security.' The Committee treats four
components which contribute to national strength. They are:
1. Positive or Dynamic Security. This means the economic
and political system which provides our nation with its
strength. It means encouragement of scientific and engi-
neering progress as well as maintaining liberty in this land as
an example or beacon for the enslaved peoples all over the
world. In the felicitous phrase of the Report, "Liberty has a
value of its own... "8
2. Military Security. The ability to protect the nation
militarily.'
3. International Security. Building up the economic and
4 NEW YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21.
"Security is gained through liberty rather than in opposi-
tion to it . . . If fear of totalitarianism were to force us into
coerced uniformity of thought and belief, we should lose se-
curity in seeking it . . . Our nation has outstripped its adver-
saries in the past through the increased power given by intel-
lectual and scientific liberty. It knows no other wa.."5
(Emphasis added)
GId. at 27.
Old. at 33.
7 Id. at 3945.
8 Id. at 40.
9 Id. at 41.
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military strength of allies and advancing international security
and well being.'0
4. Internal Security. The employment of measures necessary
to combat espionage and subversion by the Communist move-
ment."
1
Thus the New York Report deals with four of the components of
national strength and denominates them as a unit to comprise national
security. 2 It then goes on to issue this caveat:
... internal security should not be so developed and extended
that it interferes with the continuing rapid development of
science and our economy or with the sense of freedom and fair
treatment by government of the ordinary citizens . . . It
would be a mistake to single out security with its defensive or
passive character as if it were the major element or even the
whole of national security and to ignore the other elements
or take them for granted . . . It is essential that account be
taken of our democratic traditions of liberty and fair play . . .
We must never forget that the very Purpose of national
security is to preserve our independence and liberty and not
merely to combat the greatest present danger to it, Communism.
(Emphasis added)
This Report follows the above with this conclusion:
What is called for is an internal security program that will
make its full contribution to a balanced national security pro-
gram and that at the same time will protect over the years the
liberty of citizens which it is the very purpose of national
security to guard:-in other words, a program that gives both
efficiency and fair play.' 4
Having established internal security in relation to national security,
which is itself one element of national strength, the New York Report
divides internal security measures into two types, i.e., penal and preventa-
tive." The major penal laws in the internal security field are: (1) treason,
(2) espionage, (3) sabotage, and (4) advocacy of the overthrow of
government. The principal preventative measures are: (1) counterespion-
age, (2) detention, (3) publicity, (4) loyalty oaths, (5) immigration
and naturalization, (6) physical security, (7) Civil Service requirements,
and (8) personnel security.
After having established personnel security as one of many measures
contributing to internal security, which in turn is only one of several
lo Id. at 41.
11 Id. at 42.
12 Id. at 42.
13 Id. at 42-43.
14 Id. at 45.
15 id. at 4548.
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essential elements making up national security, the New York Report
proceeds to examine the federal personnel security programs and then
makes recommendations for their improvement.
It is believed that this step by step treatment by which the New
York Committee addressed itself to the problem at hand-namely, the
improvement of the Federal Loyalty-Security Program-will explain in
good measure the results achieved by the New York Committee in the
form of its recommendations. It was concerned with the spirit of the
American people'--the spirit that can simultaneously endure the burden
of security measures while insisting on the preservation and enforcement
of the liberty of American citizens.
The Comm;ssion Approach
The Commission forthrightly begins the Introduction to the Federal
Civilian Loyalty Program Section on page 3 of its over 800 page report
by stating that "the concept that the Government should employ no dis-
loyal citizens has been universally accepted, but the methods and standards
used by the Government to rid itself of these persons have raised one
of the most controversial issues of our times.""7 Further, "Federal em-
ployment is a high privilege and one which should be extended only to
those who are fully qualified in every way. In these hazardous times
when there is such grave danger that freedom may be banished from
the face of the earth, the security of the Nation must not be needlessly
exposed to compromise or injury."' 8 After asserting that the disloyal can
find opportunities to carry out their purpose of destroying our security
in any position in the Government the Commission says, "This conclu-
sion is reinforced by a consideration of personnel policy not related to
security and is the principle that disloyalty should not be rewarded by the
prestige and emoluments of public employment.""9 (Emphasis added)
To fully appreciate the import of this passage it is necessary to take
up the treatment which the Commission gives to the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Cole v. Young"0 which held that Public Law 73321 applied
only to "sensitive" positions,2 2 i.e., activities directly concerned with the
national defense. This ruling ended the application of Executive Order
10450, the order which underlies the present loyalty-security program
for the federal civilian employees, to occupants of non-sensitive positions
as now defined.
After devoting one paragraph and one footnote"3 to the Supreme
Court's holding, the Commission report allocates the next three and
16Id. at 27.
17 Co1iwssIoN REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3.
Is 1d. at 4.
19 Ibid.
20 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
21 5 U.S.C. §22-1 (1952).
22 Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 FEn. REc. 2489 (1953).
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one-half pages to arguments-including quotations from the dissent of
Justices Clark, Reed and Minton24-- against the Court's holding. The
position of the Commission, then, is that not only should all civilian
employees of federal government be loyal, as an abstract principle, but
that the loyalty machinery must be made to check each and every em-
ployee to determine that he is loyal. Regardless of the sensitivity of the
position held, or the ability to directly affect the national security, the
machinery must operate to stamp every indivdual loyal.
In sharp contrast to this, the New York Report has implicit within it
a "functional" test for determining the necessity of having a loyal-security
program apply to particular positions. It justifies the toll in treasure and
spirit25 which such a program costs the nation only when the disloyal
person could do serious harm to the national security because he occupies
a sensitive position which is defined as (1) having access to material
classified as "secret" or "top-secret", or (2) having a policy-making
function which bears a substantial relation to national security.26 The
Government Commision in actuality is guided by the principle that
disloyalty per se must be exorcised, and justifies this by having discovered
that the disloyal can find opportunities to carry out their nefarious pur-
poses in any position in the Government.27 The New York Committee
will tolerate these programs because of the harm the disloyal can do if
they occupy sensitive positions as defined, while the Commission makes
loyalty an article of faith by asserting that all positions should be covered
because all positions can be used to carry out a disloyal purpose. In other
words, "loyalty" has a value of its own.
This difference in approach is basic and makes itself manifest,
especially in terms of the scope or the number of persons that should be
covered by the programs.
SCOPE
Regardless of the defects-as judged in the light of Mr. O'Brian's
findings-that are inherent in any loyalty-security program from a
qualitative standpoint, the American tradition of fair play and individual
freedom would be strengthened in an absolute sense to the extent that
the number of persons bearing the burden of the programs is reduced
from a quantitative standpoint. This is exactly what the New York Re-
port does, and-with one major exception 2 -- exactly what the Commis-
sion Report does not do. In fact, if the reasoning underlying the
Commission Report is carried out to its logical conclusion, it is difficult to
see how almost all Americans can avoid needing a security clearance.
23 COMMISSION REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 35, n. 24.
24 Id. at 36.
25 NEW YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 117-120.
2 6 id. at 141.
27 COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4.
28 Document and Information Classification-Industrial Security Programs,
infra.
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The New York Report, which deals only with the civilian person-
nal security programs, covering approximately 6,000,000 persons, e.g.
Federal Employees Program-2,300,000; Industrial Security Program
of the Department of Defense-3,000,000; Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's Program for Contractors' Representatives-80,000; Port Security
Program-800,000; and the International Organizations Employees
Program-3,000; recommends reducing the number of persons covered
from about 6,000,000 to less than 1,500,000, which is a 75% re-
duction.2 9 Using the present test for a sensitive position," ° there would
be between 500,000 and 600,000 sensitive federal positions, 800,000
positions in the Industrial Security Program of the Department of De-
fense having access to "top-secret" and "secret" classified information,
and the employees of Atomic Energy Commission contractors handling
similarly classified information would be somewhat below the 80,000
figure mentioned above."' The test for coverage recommended by the
New York Report would look to each position individually and not to
the agency as such. If a non-sensitive agency had a position involving
policy-making functions bearing a substantial relation to national security,
that position would be affected, but not the whole agency because of
that position. For an obviously sensitive agency such as the Department
of Defense, the same test would apply to exclude from coverage those
positions having neither access to "top-secret" or "secret" classified in-
formation nor possessing a policy-making function bearing a substantial
relation to the national security."2 This can fairly be described as a
"functional" approach based on the recognition that loyalty-security pro-
grams in peacetime become truly justified in terms of the cost in money
and human values needed to eradicate disloyalty when that disloyalty can
have a material adverse effect on the national security.
The New York Committee stresses that its program recommenda-
tions would cover all positions involving a substantial danger to national
security, but would not dilute the program by applications where there
is no such danger. This would permit the concentration of efforts by
the trained security personnel where most needed. To the argument that
no person who would be a security risk in a sensitive position should hold
any federal job, or in industry having access even to confidential informa-
tion, the Committee finds the answer in part "in the fact that we have
to choose between a more effective security system in critical posts or a
less effective one in all", and the other part of the answer in the fact
that there are internal security statutes which bar Communists and mem-
bers of Communist-action, Communist-front, or Communist-infiltrated
29 NEW YORK REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 146.
20 Exec. Order No. 10450, supra note 22.
31 NEW YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 146.
32 id. at 141-142, "Access" means either authorized access or opportunity for
unauthorized access.
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organizations from federal employment. Also, the general suitability
requirements of the Civil Service Commission continue to apply to the
federal classified service.33
With the significant exception that the industrial security program
of the Department of Defense be eliminated insofar as clearances are
required for contractors' employees who have access to material classified
confidential,34 the Commission simply maintains there is no serious
questioning of the necessity for a program for screening federal civilian
personnel and applicants for employment. It sees only a question as to
the type of program which protects the national security with a minimum
sacrifice of the rights and privileges of American citizens holding federal
position, but does not see-as the New York Report does-that national
security is enhanced in an absolute sense when the loyalty-security pro-
grams are restricted to positions that permit serious harm to the national
security. Instead, the Commission breathes life into a concept of loyalty
which takes on a life-force all its own and which feeds on more and
more coverage.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS EMPLOYEES PROGRAM
Under Executive Order 10422, January 9, 1953, amended by
Executive Order 10459, June 2, 1953, procedures were established
whereby United States citizens employed by or applying for positions
with international organizations 35 are screened by the International
Organizations Employees Loyalty Board of the Civil Service Com-
mission which makes an advisory determination for the administrative
head of the employing international organization. It is the conclusion
of the Commission Report that United States citizens of doubtful loyalty,
who in recent years, it says, have held responsible positions in international
organizations, have had the opportunity to participate in policy decisions
of these organizations to an extent which would permit them to influence
policy adversely to our national security.3" Therefore, it is necessary to
continue this loyalty program for these American citizens who are not
United States Government or contractor employees. The Commission's
conclusion is based on investigations of a New York Federal Grand
Jury and the Internal Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary37, and prompts the Commission to reject the reasoning of the
New York Committee which it quotes without identifying the source. 38
The New York part of this colloquy recommends simply that the
International Organizations Employees Program he eliminated because:
(1) The program does not protect the interests of the
33 1d. at 147.
34 CoiMissIoN REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 174, 270, 273.
3 5 1 d. at 426.
36 Id. at 427.
3 7 1d. at 376-386.
3 8 Id. at 427.
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United States as these employees are completely outside the
objectives of the personnel security program since they have
no access to classified information, opportunity for espionage,
nor anything to do with making United States policy.
(2) The international program is actually harmful to United
States interest because the clearance period encourages inter-
national organizations to employ non-Americans especially for
short-term work, which could mean foreign Communists in-
stead of American citizens are hired.
(3) The program gives needless offense to other nations by
appearing to assert a special control over the international
organization and can set a precedent which would be regretta-
ble if used and followed by Communist governments.
(4) The program would only affect United States citizens
who are here as a matter of right, but does not touch
foreigners-including the Soviets--who come from abroad
as members of the United Nations Secretariat.
(5) The international organizations have their own pro-
cedures for selecting, transferring and discharging employees,
and the United States representatives could report improper
conduct.
(6) The United States could still turn over information to
the international organization if it determined there were
positions where loyalty to a foreign power by an American
might interfere with his duties to the international organiza-
tions or with America's interest3 9
THE PORT SECURrry PROGRAM
Consistent with its other assessments of the dangers facing the
national security, the Commission report-after drawing upon the hear-
ings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities investi-
gating Communist activities in maritime union 40 -finds that the Port
Security Program, 41 which bars seamen from working on American
ships unless they have "validated" documents, and which prohibits long-
shoremen from working in designated "restricted" port areas unless
they have port security cards, is of the utmost importance to the safety
of the United States.4 2 Without a validated document no seaman can
work on a ship flying the American flag, although the longshoreman can
at least work in those parts of a port not classified as "restricted" by the
Coast Guard.
In recommending the abolition of the Port Security Program, the
39 NEW YoR REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 145-146.
40 COMMISSION REPORT, oP. cit. supra note 3, at 326-331.
41 Based on The Magnuson Act, 50 U.S.C.A. 191, and implementing Executive
Orders.
42 COMMISSION REPORT op. cit. supra, note 3, at 353.
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New York Report comes directly to grip with the danger which Mr.
O'Brian exposed in his lectures. The report says, "A grave objection to
the Port Security Program is that its continuance in peacetime opens the
way for the introduction of personnel security measures throughout
American life. For it imposes security scrutiny on persons and in areas
without special justification." 4 (Emphasis added).
The lack of justification for this program is that the dangers it
ostensibly guards against, e.g. sabotage to shipping and dock facilities and
courier service by subversive seamen, can be as easily accomplished by
passengers or seamen on ships flying foreign flags. The danger to the
American way of life arises from the fact-in the New York Com-
mittee's opinion 44 -that there are other industrial activities, such as
power plants, water systems, bridges and locks, railroad tunnels, which
are more sensitive and exposed than the docks and ships, and they can
be easily disrupted by persons not even employed on the facilities. The
inexorable logic of this situation demands that if one segment of vital
facilities requires personnel security clearance of its employees, then
other equally important activities throughout industry and business
should have its employees cleared as a protection against sabatoge.
In the words of the New York Report:
Indeed, even this would not suffice, because those who are
not employees of important industrial establishments might
still sabatoge them. This logic would then lead to peacetime
personnel security clearance for almost all citizens. The
danger to liberty from such a course should cause us to set
ourselves resolutely against it." (Emphasis added).
To fight the real threat of sabotage, the Report recommends
zontinued reliance on previously effective counterespionage measures
coupled with adequate physical protection of vulnerable installations.
Also, the New York Report does not object to a reserve of investigated
seamen and longshoremen to be available during times of national
emergency.
PROPOSED CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT SECURITY PROGRAM
That the logic of the New York Report referred to above is
unassailable is seen by the fact that the Commission Report recommends
the establishment of a new security program covering civil air trans-
port. Although it follows the New York Report's logic, it in no way
sees the danger to liberty exposed by this logic which is so unmis-
takably obvious to the New York Committee. The Commission takes
the step which the New York Committee believes this nation should
resolutely set itself against.
43 NEW YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 143.44 Id. at 143, 144.
45 Id. at 144, 145.
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The reasoning of the Commission establishing the necessity for
such a program is worthy of close attention." It cites statistics which
show generally that in the year 1956, fifty-two certificated airlines op-
erating 1,448 aircraft carried 39,171,181 passengers in domestic opera-
tions alone, and the Commission believes that "the flow of so many
people through such potentially vulnerable areas offers obvious dangers
to our national security". 47 It stresses the susceptibility to sabotage
of aircraft operations, although it concedes that flight personnel would
more likely saboage flights other than their own.4" In the field of
international flights the Commission states that in 1955, 2,439,907
passengers were carried by aircraft to or from the United States and
that in the year ending June 30, 1956, more travelers crossed the
Atlantic Ocean to and from the United States by air than by steamship.
49
The employees engaged in domestic traffic numbered, as of 1956,
95,468 and in international traffic 26,656."
After pointing out the vulnerability of domestic air transport
to sabotage and usefulness to couriers, the Commission Report plumps
for personnel security clearances for only those engaged as crew
members in international flights ("These employees are in especially
strategic positions to serve as secret couriers for hostile powers or to
engage in actual espionage.""), and for those employees who have
access to air transport facilities which are to be designated by the Civil
Aeronautics Board as "restricted"Y.5  Other personnel, whether domestic
crew members or personnel who don't actually enter into the proposed
"restricted" areas, are not included.
While the Commission is subjecting to personnel security clear-
ances these two groups of American citizens engaging in their civilian
pursuits because of the ascertained dangers from sabotage, espionage
and courier service, no measures are advanced to protect against the
activities of the 39,171,181 domestic passengers and the 2,439,907
international passengers. Nothing is suggested for the crews of foreign
international airlines who might act as couriers or espionage or sabotage
agents. Likewise, there is no screening procedure proposed for those
people, whoever they might be, that send things via air mail or air
parcel post.
The Commission takes pains to point out on page 511 that the
minimum requirements for security which it is recommending "are no
more rigorous than the present requirements for access to confidential
46 COMMISSION REPORT, oi. cit. supra note 3, at 504-511.
4 7 1d. at 505.
4 8 Ibid.
49 Id. at 507.
5Od. at 508.
5 1 Id. at 507.
52 Id. at 503.
OH10 STATE LAW JOURNAL
information in the case of employees of industrial organizations work-
ing on Federal contracts." (Emphasis added). The Commission ap-
parently forgot that on pages 304 and 305 it had recommended the
abolition of the "confidential" classification as to all future information
and materials in the Industrial Security Program, because "the industrial
process is such that the various phases of a confidential contract are so
dispersed that it would be virtually impossible for an employee to as-
semble this information to the detriment of the national security,"
53
and "In the light of information available to the Commission from the
Department of Defense, it is the opinion of the Commission that the
risk is so small, considering the cost and delays incurred in the program,
that the program is unjustified."5 4  If the national security is not suf-
ficiently benefited to maintain the present program covering access to
information classified "confidential" in industrial organizations working
on federal contracts, is there any reason to believe that the minimum
requirements of security in that program would materially enhance the
national security when applied to other industries such as civil air
transport?
Also, the Commission states that in view of the sensitivity of air
transport facilities and aircraft to sabotage, it "might be assumed that
the federal government and the air transport industry had taken action
to establish a security program for personnel and facilities." 5 5 It then
says, "In fact, however, little has been done, although basic legislative
authority was enacted in 1950. " 5' The Commission does not speculate
as to whether the Federal Government and the air transport industry
failed to take action because they found such a security program unneces-
sary and/or undesirable.
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE BRANCH PROGRAM
"The Commission believes that the necessity for an employee
screening program in the Legislative Branch is incontrovertible." 57  To
help justify this the Commission quotes from a speech made by Senator
William E. Jenner, then Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee to
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, who made the following objective and uncon-
troversial statement:
Charles Kramer, also a party member, was counsel for Senator
Wagner's Senate Labor Committee, and practically wrote
the Wagner Act, which changed American free trade union-
ism into a centralized collectivist, state-directed unionism,
531d. at 176.
54 Id. at 305.
5Id. at 505.
50 Ibid.
571d. at 101.
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until the Taft-Hartley Act reversed the trend. 8
Having laid a firm foundation on such as the above quotation,
the Commission proceeds to give a clear demonstration of its modus
operandi in studying the need and operations of government security.
It says:
While the Commission has neither the authority nor the means
to verify the extent of the Communist attack upon, or infil-
tration of the Congress, it would appear indisputable not only
from the statements above, the methods and goals of the
Communist conspiracy generally, and from the application
of common sense that the legislative branch is a target of the
Soviet and the Communist Party and an adequate screening
program for its employees is not only in order, but urgently
imperative.5 9 (Emphasis added).
It should be noticed, however, that the Commission does not
recommend that Congressmen themselves be adequately screened, al-
though it would appear equally indisputable that they are in positions
from which they could do great damage to the national security.
PROPOSED JUDICIAL BRANCH PROGRAM
Pursuing the general principle that all employees of the federal
government-executive, legislative and judicial--should be subject to
at least a minimum investigation to insure that they are loyal and other-
wise suitable from the standpoint of national security, the Commission
sees no valid reason why an employee of the judicial branch should not
be screened as to his basic loyalty to the United States, thus assuring
the judiciary proper and American public that those who carry the ad-
ministrative responsibilities of the courts or assist in the preparation of
decisions are loyal, dependable Americans.
Citing nothing and quoting no one, the Commission Report finds
a basis for its recommendations in the following fashion:
In the judicial branch, the possibilities of disloyal employees
causing damage to the national security are ever present. As
an example, Federal judges, busy with evercrowded court
calendars, must rely upon assistants to prepare briefing papers
for them. False or biased information inadvertently reflected
in Court opinions in crucial security, constitutional, govern-
mental or social issues of national importance could cause severe
effects to the nation's security and to our Federal loyalty-
security system generally.6"
Again, as in the case of Congressmen, the Commission does not
recommend that judges themselves be cleared.
5 Id. at 102.
59 Ibid.
60 d. at 106.
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It is necessary at this point to quote from the vigorous dissent to
this recommendation which Commissioner James P. McGranery, former
Attorney General of the United States, makes on page 806 of the
Report. Referring to the statements set out above, he says, "This
journey into a fanciful world has summoned up a hypothetical judge
who is not only lazy and confused but almost unconscious--certainly
unaware that his opinion is 'inadvertently' reflecting false or biased infor-
mation. This member of the Commission is happy to report that no
evidence was presented at Commission conferences tending to indicate
that such a judge is now a member of the Federal judiciary, by appoint-
ment of the President of the United States with the advice and consent
of the Senate." In addition, the former Attorney General makes the
following points:
1. No evidence was presented that at any time in United
States history did a judge menace national security by being
"busy with ever-crowded court calendars" or by inadevertent
acceptance of "false or biased information."
2. The Commission's recommendation is irrelevant to the
scope of the Commission inquiry.
3. The Commission's recommendation is not based on any need
that has been demonstrated by facts ascertained or ascertainable.
4. The Commission's recommendation is a gratuitous con-
clusion drawn from premises that are purely conjectural.
5. Commissioner McGranery regretted the unwarranted in-
trusion into the judicial branch of our government by the
recommendation respecting judicial branch employees. 6'
EVALUATION
Because of the Commission Report's treatment of the application
of the loyalty-security program to all executive branch employees, inter-
national organizations' employees, seamen, longshoremen, civil air-
transport personnel, congressional employees, and Court employees, as
contrasted with the New York Report's "functional" treatment of the
necessity for coverage, the writer believes that the climate of freedom-
for-the-individual which, rather than any material comforts, makes this
great republic of ours worth protecting, would be gravely impaired if
the recommendations of the Commission on Government Security were
carried out. Enough examples have been shown to justify the con-
clusion that the Commission's thinking was dominated by the thoughts
that (1) every federal employee must be certified loyal as a matter of
abstract principle regardless of the monetary and moral costs and re-
gardless of the sensitiveness of the position; and (2) this nation is in
mortal danger from sabotage and espionage from-if the Commission's
premises and logic are correct-practically everybody. The New York
61 Ibid.
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Committee in April of 1956 pointed out where such a logic would
lead and explicitly warned against it;62 the Commission on Government
Security in June of 1957 wholeheartedly embraced the logic and com-
pletely ignored the warning.
The seed of freedom does not thrive in a hot bed of investigations,
dossiers, informants, screenings, hearings and appeals. To the writer
too much of the Commission's recommendations extending the scope
of personnel security clearances are-to borrow Commissioner McGran-
ery's phrase--"gratuitous conclusion (s) drawn from premises that
are purely conjectural".6 3 In the balance, the harm to our free way of
life as individuals and citizens is outweighed by the harm disloyal people
can do when those who are disloyal are in positions having access to
highly classified material and information, and can make decisions which
bear substantially on the national security. The objective in protecting
our nation from its enemies is to preserve our freedom; suffocating
our freedom in a miasma of clearances for everybody is not preserving
it-that is killing it.
The recommendations of the Commission on Government Se-
curity for continuing and extending the personnel security clearance
programs, which reflect the Commission's deeply held belief in the great
dangers which exist today from disloyal American citizens and is
coupled with an abiding faith in the efficacy of an ever-expanding
loyalty-security program, amount to the greatest substantive changes
proposed by the Commission. Federal action called for by the inexorably
logical conclusions to be drawn from the Commission's premises would
affect nearly every American's right to privacy and would inject the
government into areas heretofore free of governmental control. The
climate inevitably created by such measures would not be such as to be
known as the "Golden Age of American Freedom".
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
On page 737 of the Commission Report there is a proposed
amendment to Chapter 37 of Title 18 of the United States Code (re-
lating to espionage and censorship) which provides substantially that
(a) it is unlawful for any person who has obtained information classi-
fied "top secret" or "secret" to communicate any part thereof to any
person who is not authorized by law to receive such information and
(b) whoever, having obtained in any manner or by any means any
information so classified, wilfully communicates any part of such infor-
mation in any manner or by any means to any person not authorized
to receive such information, with knowledge or reason to believe that
such information is so classified and that such person is not so authorized
to receive such information, shall be fined not more than $10,000.00 or
02 NEW YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 144.
63 Coxt.issioN REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 806.
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imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
The basis for this recommendation seems to rest primarily, if
not entirely, in the next to the last paragraph of Chairman Loyd
Wright's personal statement concerning the work and accomplishment
of the Commission. It is Chairman Loyd Wright's personal opinion
that:
No citizen is entitled to take the law, and the safety of the
Nation, into his own hands. With near unanimity, the Ameri-
can journalism profession has conscientiously observed these
limits (of not disclosing classified information). The pur-
veyor of information vital to national security, purloined by
devious means, gives aid to our enemies as effectively as the
foreign agent. I commend to the special consideration
of the Congress the Commission's proposal for unequivocal
prohibition of such irresponsible and unauthorized disclosure
and for virgorous prosecution of every offender. 64
The reaction from the American press was immediate, determined
and highly vocal.6 5 The gist of the press argument is that (1) Chair-
man Wright cites not one instance in the Report to justify his assertions
and (2) when Chairman Wright says, "The final responsibility for
the difficult decisions of what shall be secret must be confided in these
loyal and devoted public servants who are qualified to make the judg-
ment,"66 he is inviting the burying of chicanery, stupidity, error and
plain old dishonesty under a smokescreen of "top-secret" and "secret"
stamps wielded by government employees with something to hide.
Chairman Wright expresses confidence in the loyal and devoted
public servants who exercise their authority to classify, but the Com-
mission Report itself recognizes that there are some genuine problems
related to overclassification within the government when it says:
Greater caution should be exercised in the assignment of
classification; classification should be evaluated on a more
realistic basis. Attempts through classification to hide the
elephant in the middle of the prairie serve only to weaken
the entire security system by trying to safeguard more than
it is possible to safeguard properly.
The Commission wishes to point out however, that the rela-
tively small number of individuals who have authority to
apply defense classifications to documents or material is over-
balanced by the great number of individuals who in the
course of their work have the authority to recommend defense
6 4 1d. at 688.
65 E.g. Letter dated July 2, 1957 from Walter Millis to the New York Times,
published July 7, 1957; Marquis Childs, Washington Post and Times-Herald,
July 5, 1957.
66 COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 688.
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classifications for documents or material within their area
of activity. As a practical matter, these individuals have de
facto authority to classify since it is patently impossible in
most agencies for the responsible official to look behind the
justification for each instance of document classification.6 7
(Emphasis added.)
If the Commission Report is correct in its assessment of the
practical situation as quoted above, then there would appear to be some
merit to the press claim that the abuse of classification could be used
to hide scandal, e.g. Teapot Dome, and information legitimately within
the public's right to know. The argument of the American press to
be free of this new restraint on its duty to keep the public informed
takes on even greater weight when it is remembered that Chairman
Wright gave no specific examples of the national security being damaged
by unauthorized disclosures of classified information by the press and
that the Commission itself merely proposed the legislation without
specifically treating the issue in a separate section.
The traditional function of our free American press could be
appreciably changed under the impact of such a severe law which
could be used to protect the acknowledged potential and actual abuse
of the power to classify information by government employees. Thus
freedom of the press is affected directly by the recommendations of the
Commission on Government Security.
TRAVEL By ALIENS; FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The writer believes that the manner in which the foreign affairs
of our nation are conducted reflect in recognizable degree the current
state of national thinking at any particular time. If this is so, then it is
reasonable to look for the effect which the thinking of the Commission
on Government Security, as translated into recommendations, might have
on the conduct of American foreign affairs, especially with regard to
travel by aliens to and from the United States.
Issuance of Visas
The admission of aliens to this country directly affects our re-
lations with the countries from which these aliens come. Large num-
bers of people are involved here with more than 1,000,000 aliens ad-
mited to the United States for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1956 of
which 321,625 sought permanent residence." s  Border crossings by
aliens, which includes the Canadian and Mexican borders, amounted
to 61,611,311 for fiscal 1955."9
Under the Walter-McCarran Act, which is the Immigration and
67Id. at 179, see also 164.
68 1d. at 570.
69 Id. at 572.
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Nationality Act of 1952,70 the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
was created in the Department of State and the Visa Office was
placed within that bureau. It coordinates the work of American con-
sular officials in foreign countries which issue visas for travel to this
country after screening and documenting those aliens seeking admission.
After the alien travels to this country, he must be passed by the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice which
is not bound to admit the alien, since the visa is not an entry permit but
an endorsement on a passport or other travel document which entitles
the alien to travel to and apply for temporary or permanent admission
to this country.
Because of the fact that the Department of Justice, through its
Immigration and Naturalization Service, has turned down aliens with
properly issued American visas, there is confusion to the alien and ex-
pense to the transportation firm which brought him," and it is the recom-
mendation of the Commission,' as well as of the Hoover Commission,
74
that the Visa Division-except for the issuance of diplomatic and official
visas-be transferred to the Department of Justice, utilizing the au-
thority granted by the Walter-McCarran Act7" to the Department of
Justice to establish offices and detail employees of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to duty in foreign countries "with the concur-
rence of the Secretary of State".
The Secretary of State has repeatedly refused to consent to this
transfer of the visa function to the Department of Justice."0 Besides the
belief that it has better sources of information plus better qualified
personnel for foreign duties, the Department of State believes that it
and the Foreign Service are the internationally accepted channels for
communication with foreign governments, and except in routine cases
it would not be wise to permit communications in potentially contro-
versial cases to be handled by another agency except through the Visa
Office of the Department of State.77 Also, the issuance of visas to
aliens directly involves relations between the United States and the
foreign countries of which the aliens are nationals, and that, in many
cases, questions of policy and trade relations must receive full considera-
tion as well as security. If the review of visa cases were to be placed
in the hands of the department responsible for security alone, there
might be an overemphasis on the security phase of a case.7 8
70 8 U.S.C.A. 1101-1503 (1952).
71 Co.MMIssioN REPORT, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 550.
7 2 d. at 572.
73 Ibid.
74 Id. at 577.
75 Section 103.
76 COMtISSION REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 3 at 574.
7 7 Id. at 577.
7 8 Id. at 576.
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It is the Commission on Government Security's position that: "To
insure maximum security in this area, responsibility properly must be
concentrated in the agency the Congress has always intended shall make
final determination of admissibility or inadmissibility. To achieve that
goal, there must be a realignment to insure complete control by the
Immigration Service from the time the alien first makes application for
a visa right down to the moment he first sets foot on the American
shoreline." 79  It seems fair to assume that it is the Commission's belief
that this would have appreciably reduced the 177 subversive aliens it
was necessary to deport-out of the millions involved-from July 1,
1950 to June 30, 1955.0
"Bonded Transit' Aliens
Section 238 (d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(Walter-McCarran Act) provided that the Attorney General shall have
power to guarantee the passage through the United States in immediate
and continuous transit of aliens whose destinations were foreign countries,
and thereafter, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State issued
regulations waiving--subject to certain specified conditions-the require-
ment for visas for such aliens."1 The Commission manifested "con-
siderable attention"8 2 in the situation created by the discretion exercised,
and the waivers granted, by the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State under this act, and set out a detailed review of the circumstances
surrounding the landing by Pan American or similar airlines in the
United States of Russian scientists attending an international conference
in Mexico City, Russian athletes who had attended the Olympic Games
in Australia, and a Soviet agricultural mission.8 3  It is the conclusion of
the Commission that "the waiver provisions of the Immigration Act have
been invoked by both the Attorney General and the Secretary of State
in a manner inimical to the security of the United States."'s (Emphasis
added).
The Commission points out that, as in the case of the Russian
scientists attending the Mexico City meeting, the Russian Olympic
contingent did not apply for visas and therefore were not fingerprinted.
In fact, "while they were in Los Angeles a tour of Hollywood was
arranged by Pan American before their departure for Copenhagan." 85
In tracking down this whole thing, the Commission received a reply
from the Department of State on December 28, 1956 which confirmed
information in its hands that this Olympic contingent had been granted
791d. at 578.
80 Id. at 571.
81 Id. at 556.
82Id. at 598.
83 Id. at 592-602.
84 Id. at 593.
s5 Id. at 598.
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a waiver to land on or about December 12, 1956 in Los Angeles on
the basis of "unforeseen emergency." This letter received by the
Commission showed clearly that the Attorney General and the Secretary
of State had "foreseen" that this "unforeseen emergency" would occur
in December, when they agreed back in August of 1956 that this
waiver was to be granted. 6  "The excuse offered (by the Department
of State) was that 'it did not appear to be in the best interests of the
United States to refuse to cooperate with the holding of the Olympics
or to do anything which might be interpreted as interference with
competitors to the American teams.' ""
The Commission then goes on to say:
In the course of the Commission's investigation, we were
continuously reminded by the Immigration Service, represent-
atives of airlines and trade associations that there are no
instances of record where a subversive has ever gained admis-
sion to the United States in bonded transit. This by no
means discounts the possibility that it has happened or that
it can happen, even though there is no present official knowl-
edge of sucli an occurrence. The Commission also desires
to point out that the airlines and the Immigration Service
have both admitted that no security check is made of airline or
non-governmental agency personnel assigned to maintain sur-
veillance of aliens traveling in bonded transit." (Emphasis
added).
This then explains the Commission's recommendations for tightening
up the bonded transit alien provisions.8 9
Soviet Bloc Nationals Who Enter As Government Officials
"The Commission recommends discontinuance of the practice of
admitting artists and others under the guise of their being official govern-
ment employees. This practice appears to be in violation of the law." 90
Some of those listed under this category are a Soviet pianist and cellist,
a Polish pianist, five Soviet Baptists, and eight Soviet churchmen
sponsored by the National Council of Churches. 9
Requiring Visas For All Foreign Crewmen
Section 221(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
provides, inter alia, that foreign crewmen of a ship or aircraft can still
disembark, if they have passports and if they are listed on a crew list
visaed by a consular officer, until such time as the United States can
86Id. at 597.
8 7Id. at 598.
88 Ibid.
89Id. at 592.
90 M. at 605.
9' Id. at 605.
[Vol. 18
FREEDOM AND THE REPORT
practicably issue visas for each individual crewman.9 2 As of July 31,
1955 only 42,921 visas of this type had been issued, so early in this
session of Congress the Eisenhower administration sponsored a "bill
which would amend section 221(S) to eliminate the requirement for
individual documents on the ground that this requirement of the act
has proved to be difficult to administer, unduly burdensome and unnec-
essary".
9 3
Relying on the contrary views expressed by a special subcommittee of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, the "Commission believes that a
substantial security problem is involved and that an acceptable system
for the issuance of visas or some similar type of documentation can
best be handled by the Immigration Service in the performance of its
duties at the various ports of entry". 9"
Possible Significance to the Conduct of Foreign Affairs
The Commission has discovered and criticized the cooperation of
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General in possible technical
violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 in permitting
Russian Olympic teams to stop-over in bonded transit and admitting
Soviet and Polish artists and churchmen as government officials. The
Commission should be commended for wanting the law upheld, but in
a study of this nature it would seem pertinent to ask why such responsible
men as the Secretary of State and the Attorney General chose to ignore
the law. Could it be that the strictures imposed by the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 place an unnecessary and impossible burden
on the conduct of American foreign policy which it is the primary
responsibility of the President of the United States to conduct, and for
which purpose the Secretary of State is appointed? Given the state
of the world today; the reliance which this country places upon its
world-wide series of alliances with foreign powers; and the attempts,
however tentative, to ease the cold-war tension with the Soviet Union
and its now somewhat less than totally subservient satellites, it can fairly
be asked if the increase in "security" which the commission apparently
believes its collection of recommendations in this field would achieve,
does not fall short of the overall security to be gained through an
executive branch flexibly conducting foreign affairs without restrictions
of this type.
In the conduct of foreign affairs, the effect of the Commission's
recommendations is to shear the State Department of its visa function
on the assumption that Department of Justice personnel would do a
better job in so far as security is concerned. Could Immigration and
Naturalization Service personnel overseas be counted on to be better
02 I,. at 603.
93 Ibid.
94 Id. at 604.
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qualified and enjoy better sources of information than State Department
and Foreign Service personnel, when looked at from the overall foreign
affairs point of view? In the bonded transit alien episodes, isn't it
possible that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General were
forced into manufacturing a "foreseeable unforeseen emergency" be-
cause of the inadequacies of the statute involved? (Who was really
in greater danger-Hollywood or the Russian Olympic athletes?) With
regard to the Russian concert artists and churchmen, the Commission
apparently was unconcerned as to why the alleged violation of the law
was permitted by the Executive branch agencies. Could it be that that
gentle subterfuge was felt necessary as a matter of foreign policy? In
dealing with foreign crewmen, the administration has found the require-
ment for individual visas to be difficult to administer, unduly burdensome,
and unnecessary, but the Commission sides with a House Subcommittee
in feeling that the continued absence of such visas presents a substantial
security problem.
The writer believes that the attempt by the legislative branch to
accomplish "maximum security" through greater elaboration of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 portends greater difficulty for
the executive branch in conducting American foreign affairs wisely. If
carried on farther, it could represent a serious weakening on the part
of the President to shape and execute foreign policy.
WIRETAPPING
The Commission Report devotes only little more than three pages
to its treatment of information obtained by wiretapping." "The Com-
mission recommends that a separate wiretapping law be enacted which
would eliminate the evidentiary disability ascribed to information pro-
cured by wiretapping in criminal prosecutions only for violations of our
security laws".9" The proposed bill drafted by the Commission" per-
mits the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the investigation agencies
of the Army, Navy and Air Force to employ this technique ". . . upon
express written authorization given by the Attorney General to the head
of such agency . . . if that interception is specifically described as to
place and time in the authorization so given."
The Commission believes that "the requirement that authorization
for the wiretap be obtained personally from the Attorney General should
allay any apprehensions that the authority will be used indiscriminately
for the mere purpose of invading the privacy of American citizns'. s
Considering the press of duties of the Attorney General of the United
States, a reasonable man might well be a little apprehensive as to the
05 id. at 627-630.
96 Id. at 629.
97 Id. at 735.
98 Id. at 630.
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attention which this man might be able to give to the requests for
wiretap authorizations coming from the Federal Bureau of Investigat-
tion and such investigative agencies as the Counter Intelligence Corps
of the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of
Special Investigations of the Air Force. With the programs as broad
as the Commission thinks they need to be, this could well mean a
volume of requested authorizations of such magnitude that the appre-
hensions as to the indiscriminate invasion of the privacy of American
citizens would not be allayed. At any rate, if enacted, this statute
would represent one more inroad into the precious reserve of privacy
left to an individual citizen of these United States.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LIST
The Attorney General's list of subversive organizations, which
was first published openly in the FEDERAL REGISTER9 9 in 1948 and
has now around 300 organizations listed, was originally compiled before
that time for the purpose of confidentially advising the various executive
departments that the organizations listed were Communist or otherwise
subversive in nature. Since its public disclosure, it has been the object
of much criticism as having serious weaknesses and being misapplied.'
An interesting insight into the respective frames of reference from
which the New York Committee and the Commission on Government
Security approached this huge and vitally important problem of loyalty-
security might be gained from the first sentences of their respective recom-
mendations regarding the Attorney General's list. The New York
Report says, "The Attorney General's list of subversive organizations
should be abolished, unless it can be and is modified and revised in the
following respects. . . "",' The Commission Report says, "The At-
torney General's list should be retained with the modifications listed
below."' 0 2 (Emphasis added.)
The New York Committee believes that the abolition of the list
would not weaken in the slightest the assistance which the Attorney
General could and should give the executive departments having per-
sonnel security programs, because on request the Attorney General
would supply any information in his possession on organizations whose
nature was relevant to a security inquiry in the requesting department.10 3
Since its original purpose was to provide information for the Federal
executive departments alone, the publication generally of the Attorney
General's list is not essential.
09 13 FED. REG. 1471 (194S).
100 CoMMISsioN REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 100, 645 passim.
NEw YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 154-157.
101 NEw YORK REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 2 at 154.
102 ColiMIssloN REPORT, Op. Cit. supra note 3, at 96.
103 NEw YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 157.
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However, if the list is to be retained, the New York Report says
it should be revised as follows:
(1) The list should not include any organization which has
been defunct more than ten years. (Any information needed
concerning removed defunct organizations could still be
requested from the Department of Justice.)
(2) The list should give information as to the period and
the general nature of the subversive activity of each organiza-
tion listed.
(3) The list should be kept up to date by periodical supple-
ments eliminating long defunct organizations and adding or-
ganizations newly found to be subversize.
(4) The list should include only those organizations which
have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard in
conformity with the requirements of due process of law.
(5) The list should contain a statement that mere member-
ship in any of the organizations listed is not in itself to be
construed as establishing the subversive character of a member
unless membership has been made illegal by statute. 104
The Commission report recommends the retention of the list with
modifications which bring it appreciably into line with the New York
Report's list, revised as above described, although the New York Report
believes first that the list should be abolished and retained only if cor-
rected. The Commission Report's suggested changes would supply infor-
mation as to the period and nature of the subversive complexion of the
organization and would require notice and an opportunity to be heard
for the organization. However, the Commission Report, unlike the
New York Report, does not provide for judicial review of the final
determination by the Attorney General."0 5 The Commission does stress
that care must be taken to avoid misinterpretation of afiliation with
one of these organizations, and that the mere fact of membership
should not be conclusive evidence of the individual's unfitness for
employment.106
Thus, to some extent at least, while the New York Committee and
the Government Commission may have opposite views on the substantive
question of whether there should be such a list, they do approach a
common ground when it comes to a question of procedure if the list is
to be continued.
PROCEDURES
Because the Commission on Government Security's study "has
shown that the uncoordinated and often inefficient and ineffective loyalty-
104Id, at 154.
'
0 5id. at 156. COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 98.
100 COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 100.
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security programs now in force seriously need central direction of a
type permitting the sound conduct of official business yet insuring that
neither the Government's security is jeopardized nor the rights of the
individual infringed", 0 7 the Commission has recommended the estab-
lishment of a Central Security Office which would provide the needed
uniform and coordinated administration of the loyalty-security pro-
grams."'8 The New York Committee similarly recommended the cre-
ation of an Office of Director of Personnel and Information Security
which could act to reduce or eliminate the present lack of uniformity
and supervision and diversity of methods of administration." .
Without attempting to compare closely the similarities or differences
between the respective recommendations of the Commission and the
Committee concerning the central agency, it is difficult to ignore the
different stages at which the two groups think the central agency should
first come into the personnel security clearance process. The Commission
characterized the present hearing board operations as being of a
"desultory nature","10 and recommends that a hearing conducted by a
full-time, specially qualified and trained hearing examiner, appointed by
the Director of the Central Security Office, be the first stage at which
the central agency would come into a particular case."' This hearing
stage, of course, comes after an original investigation and screening to
determine whether or not the derogatory information warrants the
hearing. The Commission rejects the contention that the central agency
should handle the screening stage primarily on the grounds that the
head of the agency concerned has the ultimate responsibility for the
disposition of each case and also should make the initial decision as to
whether loyalty charges should be made."1
2
This is an extremely vital point in the future operation of the
federal loyalty-security programs, and to the writer the reasoning sup-
porting the different recommendation of the New York Committee is
more persuasive. Noting that a high percentage of persons are cleared
after security charges are filed against them, the New York Committee
concludes that this reflects care on the part of hearing boards but laxity
in the filing of charges."' The Committee then says, "The filing of
security charges has such a tremendous impact upon persons directly and
indirectly involved, and constitutes such significant waste of manpower
through suspension of persons charged and involvement of government
personnel in the administration of the procedures, that every effort
107 Id. at 633.
lOSld at 633-643.
109 NEW YORK REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 137-140.
11(' COMMISSION REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 636.
111 Id. at 61-66.
112 1d. at 58.
113 NEW YCRK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 159.
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should be made to file charges only when a substantial security issue is
involved.""' 4  The Committee makes the analogy that the screening
board of the central agency would function like a grand jury."' The
interest of the particular agency involved would be protected under the
New York Committee's scheme by having the hearing conducted by a
hearing board appointed by the head of the agency, and the final security
determination would be made by the head of the charging agency.n1
The relative merits of these two suggestions, i.e., the central
screening board prior to an agency hearing as proposed by the Committee,
and the agency screening prior to a central hearing examiner as proposed
by the Commission, need careful weighing. If the aim is to reduce the
number of ill-founded charges formally brought, it would appear that
the Committee's recozmmendation is better suited. This is one procedural
matter which can affect the entire atmosphere in which the persons
covered by these programs live and work. It is such an important point
that Dudley B. Bonsal, Chairman of the New York Committee, was
moved to write that, "The screening and hearing processes are, of course,
the heart of the programs. Objectivity and open-mindedness by the
screening and hearing authorities are essential and these are not likely to
flow from the Commission's recommendation."" ' 7
117 Letter to The New York Times, July 14, 1957 in Letters to Editor Column.
Two of the special studies made by the Commission were "Con-
frontation""' and "Subpena Power","' and the New York Committee
made recommendations covering "Appearance of Witnesses and Con-
frontation."'1 20 Suffice it to say here that to whatever extent the various
procedural recommendations made by the two studying groups enlarge
or restrict the freedom of the individual, they at least evince the recog-
nition on the part of the two groups that the procedures presently em-
ployed are in need of improvement.
DOCUMENT AND INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION AND
THIE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
The Department of Defense Industrial Security Program and the
Atomic Energy Commission Industrial Security Program affect the jobs
of the employees of the respective agency contractors on the basis of
whether or not the particular employee has access to information which
is classified as either "confidential", "secret" or "top-secret". Thus,
it is access-to-information clearance and not employment clearance as
in the other federal loyalty-security programs.12 1
114 Id. at 160.
115 Ibid.
110 Id. at 168, passim.
118 COMMISION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 657.
11O Id. at 673.
120 NEW YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 173.
121 Id. at 64.
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It is on this point that the Government Commission and the New
York Committee seem to start off on the same premises, apply the same
reasoning process and come out with the same recommendations. Sub-
stantively, this is an unusual occurrence for these two reports.
The Government Commission succinctly recommends "the abolition
of the 'confidential' classification of all future defense information and
materials".' 2 2 It does this because the phrase "could be prejudicial to
the national security", which is the definition for the "confidential"
classification in Executive Order 10501 of 1953,2' is "so vague and
broad as to furnish no reasonable basis for its application". 1 24 Further-
more, "Any risk involved in the abolition of confidential, at least so far
as the industrial security program is concerned, is minimized by the fact
that the various industrial phases of a confidential contract are so dis-
persed as to make it virtually impossible for any employee to assemble
the information to the detriment of the national security"." It should
also be borne in mind that clearance for industrial employees having
access to "confidential" information is granted by the private industrial
contractor merely on the basis of the employee's citizenship and the lack
of any derogatory information relating to such employee in the files of
the private contractor. 20 Therefore, the Commission recommends the
elimination of the "confidential" classification because ". . . the dis-
advantage arising out of the confidential category, in the light of the
risk, the nature of the information and materials falling within that
category, and the cost and delay involved, outweigh any advantages to
the national security to be derived from its retention"."'
This obviates the necessity of private industrial contractors clearing
those employees working on contracts classified "confidential". 28 (For
the Department of Defense Industrial Security Program alone, the
New York Committee learned that the number covered by the program
would be reduced from nearly 3,000,000 to only about 800,000,'29 and
it is of the belief that the reduction of the number of persons covered
by all of the programs, industrial and otherwise, would enhance rather
than lessen the national security.)... Further in line with curtailing the
number of persons covered by the industrial security program is the
recommendation by the Commission that power to apply defense classi-
fications not be expanded and that only those agencies now having such
122 COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 174.
123 18 FED. REG. 1049 (1953) ; NEw YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 246.
124 COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 174.
125 Id. at 176.
126 Id. at 175
127 Id. at 176.
128 Ibid.
129 NEw YORK REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 146.
1 o Ibid.
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authority should continue to possess defense classification authority.313
The Commission also recommends that each agency should make every
effort to reduce the number of employees having the authority to classify
or to recommend classification.1
3 2
The performance of the Government Commission in analyzing the
operation of the document and information classification-industrial se-
curity programs displays a functional approach to the problem of security
and shows what can be done when the approach is not colored by a
hyper-sensitive assessmentt of the damage which the lowliest worker in
the least sensitive government job can do to the national security. Or it
may be that the approach of the Commission elsewhere really betrays its
belief that as a matter of doctrine every government employee, no
matter how unrelated to a sensitive position he may be, must at least be
stamped loyal if not pure.
AN APPRECIATION
Locked within Mr. O'Brian's list of inroads into our American
conception of fair play is an understanding and evaluation of what
freedom for the individual has meant and should continue to mean in
our American society. It is a deep, basic point of view. An echo of
this point of view may be found in a letter written to the New York
Times by Dudley B. Bonsal, Chairman of the New York Committee,
after the publication of the Government Commission Report. He said,
"We [the bar association committee] believe, as American citizens, that
programs of this type are alien to our fundamental beliefs, obstruct the
liberty of our citizens and can only be justified on the basis and within
the limits of a clear and present danger."' 3 3 The writer was not able to
discern any comparable credo in the Report of the Commission on
Government Security, which may help to explain the different results
achieved by the Commission on Government Security and the Special
Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York.
131 COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 77.
132 id. at 179.
133 Letter to The New York Times, op. cit. supra note 117.
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